Migration and Public Expenditure: the Host Country Point of view by Basevi, Giorgio & Tarozzi, Alessandro
Migration and public expenditure: the host
country point of view
Giorgio Basevi
Alessandro Tarozzi
Department of Economics, University of Bologna
Introduction footnote 
TheflowsofmigrationfromneighbouringcountriesintotheEuropeanUnionhave, sinceits





countries, asItalyandGreecebeforethem, alsobecamemembersoftheCommunity. Migration
flowsfromTurkey, ontheotherhand, weresloweddownonlybyspecificrestrictions,
particularlyinGermany, andwill probablybenolongerelevantoncethecustomsunion
betweentheEU andTurkeyiscompleted. In themeantime, migrantsfromSouthern
Mediterranean, EasternEuropean, andotherextra-EU countrieskeeppressingattheEU borders.
TherecentflowofillegalimmigrantsfromAlbania, particularlyintoItalyandGreece, isonlythe
latestandmoredramatisedxampleofalargerandcontinuingphenomenon.




In thispaper, asanattemptatexploringsometheoreticalbasisofthesephenomena, we
consideracountryintowhichimmigrationtakesplaceexogenously. footnote Themodelusedto
describeitseconomyisbasedonoverlappinggenerations. Peoplegothroughtwoperiodsintheir





country, andimmigrants. Withoutattachinganyparticularvaluejudgmenttoit, wemakethe
assumptionthathegovernmentofthehostcountry, inoptimisingitsbehaviour, takesinto
accountonlytheutilityof indigenousresidents. footnote 
Weassumethatheexogenousrateof immigrationishigherthantherateofgrowthofnative
population. Also, weassumethat, relativetoapreviousituationwhenthepensionschemewas
putinplace, therateofgrowthof indigenouspopulationhasfallenbelowtherateof interest.
Thuspromisesofa”payasyougo” pensionschemecannolongerbekept, andanewscheme








influencethesedecisions. Theyaretherateof labourincometaxation, andtheshareofpension
















1?K   #   
Residentpopulation footnote attimet (i.e. Rt) ismadeupofnativeworkers(Nt,t), native
retiredpeople(Nt?1,t), newlyimmigratedworkers(Mt,t), andretiredguestworkers(Mt?1,t):
Rt = ÝNt,t + Mt,tÞ + ÝNt?1,t + Mt?1,tÞ = Lt,t + Nt?1,t + Mt?1,t   #   
whereLt,t ¯ Nt,t + Mt,t istotalabourforceattimet. Weassumethatnativepeopledonot
migrate, sothat:
Nt,t = Nt?1,tÝ1+ nÞ   #   
wheren isthegivenconstantrateofgrowthofnativepopulation. Totalimmigrants(Mt,t) may
resideandworklegally(M# t,t) orillegally(M* t,t) inthehostcountry:
Mt,t ¯ M# t,t + M* t,t   #   
Forsimplicityweassumethatbothflowsof immigration—legalandillegal— growatthesame
ratem, sothat:
Mt,t = Mt?1,t?1Ý1+ mÞ   #   
andthat:
Mt?1,t = M# t?1,t = NM# t?1,t?1   #   
whereN istheshareofyounglegalimmigrantshatdecidetoremaininthehostcountryafter





ÝNt?1,t + NM# t?1,t?1Þgt + Ý1? NÞM# t?1,t?1Sgt = bgtL# t   #   
where
L# t = Nt,t + M# t,t = Lt,t ? M* t,t
isthelegalabourforce, andwheregt isthebasicpercapitagovernmenttransferinrealterms, b
istherateof labourincometaxation, andgt istherealwage. Notethatin( ref: gbudget1 ) we
haveassumedthatlabourtaxesareleviedonlyonlegalabourincome, andthathesameapplies
togovernmenttransfers. Wehavealsoassumedthatlegalimmigrantsreturningtotheircountry
oforiginafteretirementreceiveonlyapart(0 ² S ² 1) ofthebasictransferpaidtoallother
(bothnativeandimmigrated) retiredresidents. Collectingtermsin( ref: gbudget1 ) weget:
áNt?1,t + ßN + SÝ1? NÞàM# t?1,t?1âgt = bgtL# t   #   
Consumersfacedifferentbudgetconstraints, accordingtotheirstatus:
a) if theyarenatives, orlegalimmigrantshatdecidetoretireinthehostcountry:
ptct,t + pt+1ct,t+1 = Ý1? bÞgtpt + pt+1gt+1   #   
b) if theyarelegalimmigrantshatdecidetoretireintheiroriginalcountry:
ptc# t,t + pt+1c# t,t+1 = Ý1? bÞgtpt + pt+1Sgt+1   #   
c) if theyareillegalimmigrants:
ptc* t,t + pt+1c* t,t+1 = Ý1? eÞgtpt   #   
wheree istherateof”taxation” thatcriminalorganisationscollectonillegalabourincometo





Ct = ct,tÝNt,t + NM# t,tÞ + c# t,tÝ1? NÞM# t,t + c* t,tM* t,t +












gt = Ý1? KÞkt
K
  #   
wherert+1 istherateofreturntocapital, equaltotheinterestrate, fromperiodt toperiodt+ 1,
and
kt ¯ Kt/Lt ¯ Kt/ÝNt,t + M# t,t + M* t,tÞ   #   
Optimisationbyconsumers—natives, legalandillegalimmigrants— determinespercapita
consumptioni thetwoperiods:
ct,t = J Ý1? bÞgt + pt+1pt gt+1
c# t,t = J Ý1? bÞgt + pt+1pt Sgt+1
c* t,t = JÝ1? bÞgt
  #   
ct,t+1 = Ý1+ rt+1ÞÝ1? JÞ Ý1? bÞgt + pt+1pt gt+1
c# t,t+1 = Ý1+ rt+1ÞÝ1? JÞ Ý1? bÞgt + pt+1pt Sgt+1
c* t,t+1 = Ý1+ rt+1ÞÝ1? JÞÝ1? bÞgt
  #   
Totalcapitalaccumulationresultsfromdomesticsaving. Weassumethathecountrybuildsits
owncapitalstockbycostlessmouldingoftheconsumptiongoodintophysicalcapital, andthatit
doessoonlyonthebasisof itsownsaving(bynationals, legalandillegalimmigrants), without
borrowingfromabroad. Thus
Kt+1 = Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞgt ? J
pt+1
pt gt+1 ÝNt,t + NM
# t,tÞ +
+ Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞgt ? J
pt+1
pt Sgt+1 Ý1? NÞM
# t,t +
+ Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞgtM* t,t   #   
Notethat, inderiving( ref: indcons2 ), wehaveusedtheintertemporalequilibriumcondition
1+ rt+1 =
pt
pt+1   #   
In ( ref: capital ) wehavealsoassumedthatcapitaliswhollyconsumedbyretiredworkers, who
leavenobequestsotheyounggeneration. footnote 
Inordertocomparedifferentsituations, wereferonlytotheutilityderivedfrom
consumptionbynativeresidents. Inotherwords, weassumethathewelfareof immigrantsi of
relativelyminorconcerntothegovernmentofthehostcountry. footnote Focusingontheutility
functionofnativeresidents, wecanseethat, forgivenb andg, itdependsunivocallyongt, and
thereforeonthecapital/labouratiokt. Thusweneedtomakeexplicithedeterminantsof
per-workerstockofcapital. From( ref: capital ) thisisequalto:
kt+1 =
Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞgt ? J pt+1pt gt+1 ÝNt,t + NM# t,tÞ
Nt+1,t+1 + M# t+1,t+1 + M* t+1,t+1
+
+
Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞgt ? J pt+1pt Sgt+1 Ý1? NÞM# t,t
Nt+1,t+1 + M# t+1,t+1 + M* t+1,t+1
+
+ Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞgtM
* t,t
Nt+1,t+1 + M# t+1,t+1 + M* t+1,t+1
  #   
Notethat, fromthegovernmentbudgetconstraint( ref: gbudget1 ), wehave:
gt =
bgtL# t
Nt?1,t + ßN + SÝ1? NÞàM# t?1,t?1
  #   
Leadingforward( ref: gt ) byoneperiod, substitutingtheexpressionforgt+1, anddividing
numeratoranddemominatorbyNt,t weget: footnote 
gt+1 =
bÝ1? KÞkt+1
K Ý1+ nÞ + M
# 0
N0
Ý1+ mÞÝ 1+m1+n Þ
t





Assumingm> nandtakingthelimitfort ¸ K, wegetthesteadystatevalue:
gMD =
bÝ1? KÞÝkMD ÞKÝ1+ mÞ
N + SÝ1? NÞ
  #   
wheretheD andtheindexM denotethevalueofavariableinsteadystateswithmigration.
Similarly, dividingbyNt,t bothnumeratoranddenominatorin( ref: smallk ), weget:
kt+1 =
Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞÝ1? KÞkt
K ? J pt+1pt gt+1 Ý1+ NQ# tÞ
1+ n+ Ý1+ mÞQ# t + Ý1+ mÞQ* t
+
+
Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞÝ1? KÞkt
K ? J pt+1pt Sgt+1 Ý1? NÞQ# t
1+ n+ Ý1+ mÞQ# t + Ý1+ mÞQ* t
+
+ Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞÝ1? KÞkt
KQ* t
1+ n+ Ý1+ mÞQ# t + Ý1+ mÞQ* t
  #   
where











Fort ¸ K ( ref: smallk2 ) becomes:
kMD =





pt ßN + SÝ1? NÞà




M# 0 + M* 0
; andW* ¯ M
* 0




Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞÝ1? KÞÝkMD ÞK ? JW#gMD
pt+1
pt ßN + SÝ1? NÞà
1+ m
SubstitutingforgMD from( ref: gm1 ) weget
kMD = Ý1? KÞÝkMD ÞK
Ý1? JÞÝ1? bÞ ? JbW# Ý1+ mÞ pt+1pt
1+ m
  #   
Weassumethatherateofgrowthofnativepopulation, , is lowerthanr. Thusa”payasyou
go” pensionscheme—possiblybasedonahighernativerateofgrowththathassteadily
decreased— isnolongerviableandhasbecomeinferiortoonebasedoncapitalisation, if the
countryisdemographicallyisolatedfromtherestoftheworld. However, asdemographicgrowth
inothercountries, andimmigrationfromthem, areassumedtobehigher, thegovernmentshould
controlthefinancingof itspensiontransferssoastomakem= r > n. Bysodoingitmaximises
theintergenerationalwe fareofnativeswitha”payaasyougo” pensionscheme.
Inordertoreachthissituation, thegovernmentwill havetoselectheappropriatelabourtax








  #   
andsolving( ref: kstar1 ) forthesteadystatelevelofkMD , weobtain:
kMD =




  #   
It followsthathesteadystateleveloftherealwageis:
gMD = Ý1? KÞ








N + SÝ1? NÞ








Wehaveassumedthathegovernmentsetsb = bD soastomaximiseintergenerational
welfare, foragivenrateofgrowthmoftotalimmigration. However, theutilityattainedby
residentswithmigration, dependsontheshareof legalimmigrantshatdecidetorepatriateafter
retirement, andontheshareof immigrantshatareillegal. In factthesesharesdeterminethe
capitalstockandthewagerateoftheeconomy. Thus, overalltherearetwofiscalinstruments, S
andb, throughwhichthegovernmentcantrytomaximisethelevelofutilityof itsnationalsin
thepresenceofmigration. From( ref: utility ) and( ref: c1budget ) wehave:
UMt = JJßÝ1+ rt+1ÞÝ1? JÞà1?J Ý1? bÞgt +
pt+1
pt gt+1
Makinguseof( ref: grule ), thisbecomes:
UMt = JJßÝ1+ mÞÝ1? JÞà1?J Ý1? bDÞgt + 11+ mgt+1
SubstitutingthesteadystatevaluesofgMD andgMD from( ref: omegam ) and( ref: gm2 ) weget:
UMD = AM 1? bD + b
D
N + SÝ1? NÞ




  #   
where
AM ¯ Ý1? KÞJJßÝ1? JÞÝ1+ mÞà1?J   #   







1? JW* à 6
6 1? bD + b
D
N + SÝ1? NÞ





+ AM 1? 1N + SÝ1? NÞ









1? ßN + SÝ1? NÞà
  #   
Notethat, forgivenS < 1, theoptimalrateof labourincometaxationin( ref: taustar ) is lower
thehigheristheshareN ofimmigrantshatdecidetoremaininthehostcountryafteretirement,
andthehigheristheratioS. Moreoverit ishigherthelargeristheshareW* = 1? W# of
immigrationwhichis illegal. Whilethelastresultappearsintuitive, thefirsttwomayseem
puzzling. Furtheranalysisisrequired.
The optimallevelof transferto non-resident
immigrants
Consideringagainequation( ref: Um ), wecanseethatUMD isanegativefunctionofS. It
followsthat, forgivenN andb, thevalueofS thatmaximisesthenationals’ utilitywouldbe
S = 0. Inotherwords, if thequota1? N oflegalimmigrantshatdecidetoretireintheirhome
countryisexogenous, it isclearthathegovernmentofthehostcountry, sinceitcaresonlyabout
itsnationals’ utility(orrather, itspermanentresidents’ utility), shouldminimisetheamountof
transferpaidtoimmigrantshatretireintheircountryoforigin. Suchapolicy, inthesituation
describedbyourmodel, itwouldbetantamounttoconfiscatingtheirpensioncredit.
The choice to retirein thehomecountry
Assume, however, thathequota1? N oflegalimmigrantshatretireintheirhomecountryis
apositivefunctionoftheshareS ofthebasictransfer, towhichtheyareentitledif theyreturn
home. Inotherwords, letusassumethat
N = fÝSÞ withfv < 0   #   
Letusalsoassumethatheshareof illegalimmigrantsi adecreasingfunctionofb. In fact
illegalimmigrantsaresupposednottohaveotherchoicethangoingbacktotheircountryof
originafteretirement, obviouslywithoutanytransferf omthehostcountrygovernment. As they
pay”taxes” likelegalimmigrants—inthesensethatheygetthesamenetrealwage—, butget
notransferwhenretiredintheirhomecountry, theirincentivetobelegalratherthanillegalis
primarilyanegativefunctionofb, footnote whichforthemcorrespondstoapurelossof income.
Thusweassume:
W* = jÝbÞ withj v < 0   #   
From( ref: Um ) wehave:
UMD = AM 1? bD + b
D
N + SÝ1? NÞ




= FM 1? bD + b
D
N + SÝ1? NÞ ß
1? J ? bDÝ1? W*JÞà
K







  #   
Substituting( ref: deltaf ) and( ref: muf ) weget:
UMD = FM 1? bD + b
D
fÝSÞ + SÝ1? fÝSÞÞ
ß1? J ? bDÝ1? jÝbDÞJÞà
K
1?K   #   
Letusspecificallyassumethat:
N = fÝSÞ = N0 + N1S withN1 < 0   #   
with
fÝ1Þ = 0
fÝ0Þ = _ ² 1
  #   
Inwords, _ istheshareof immigrantshatremaininthehostcountryafteretirement, whenthe
hostcountrygovernmentdoesnottrasferanythingtothemincasetheyweretoreturnhome.
Thusthecomplementaryparameter1? _ measurestheimmigrants’ desiretoreturnhomewhen
retired. footnote Notealsothatin( ref: ass2 ) wehaveassumedthat, if immigrantswereto
receivethewholeofthebasictransferwhentheyretireinthehomecountry, thentheywill all
decidetoreturnhome.
Makinguseofboth( ref: deltass ) and( ref: ass2 ), wehave:
0 = N0 + N1
_ = N0 = ?N1
  #   
ThusfÝSÞ becomes:
fÝSÞ = _Ý1? SÞ   #   
The choice to immigrateillegally
Letusalsoassumethat
W* = jÝbÞ = W* 0 + W* 1b withW* 1 < 0   #   
with
jÝ1Þ = 0
jÝ0Þ = V ² 1
  #   
Inotherwords, V isthemaximumshareof immigrantshatenterthecountryillegally, andit
correspondstothezerolevelof labourincometaxation(b = 0). Conversely, whenb = 1, all
immigrantsenterthecountrylegally, footnote i.e. V = 0. Thuswehave:
0 = W* 0 + W* 1
V = W* 0 = ?W* 1
  #   
sothathejÝbÞ functionbecomes:
jÝbÞ = VÝ1? bÞ   #   
Substituting, weget:
UMD = FM 1? bD + b
D
_Ý1? SÞ2 + S
ß1? J ? bDÝ1? VÝ1? bDÞJÞà
K
1?K   #   
fromwhichitcanbeseenthat, inordertomazimiseUMD bycontrollingS, it isenoughto
minimize_Ý1? SÞ2 + S withrespecttoS. Thus, thefirstorderconditionrequires:
/ß_Ý1? SÞ2 + Sà
/S
= ?2_Ý1? SDÞ + 1 = 0
or
SD = 1? 1
2_
  #   
Notethat, sinceitcannotbenegative, theoptimumvalueofSD reducestoSD = 0when_ ² 1/2.
Thismeansthat, if morethanhalfofguestworkersdecidetoreturnhomeafteretirementeven











S. footnote Consideringthat( ref: deltass ) implies









1? ßN + SÝ1? NÞà
wesubstitute( ref: mutilde ) andget
bD ? Ý1? JÞÝ1? KÞ
ß1? JVÝ1? bDÞà
= K ? 2K
1? SD   #   
Substituting( ref: tetastar ) wehaveanequationofsecondegreeinbD:
JVÝbDÞ2 + ß1? JVÝKÝ1? 4_Þ + 1ÞàbD
? ßÝ1? JÞÝ1? KÞ + KÝ1? 4_ÞÝ1? JVÞà = 0   #   
WewouldliketoknowhowbD dependsontheparametersJ, K, V, and_. Beforedoingso,
however, wewantfirsttochecktheformthatheexpressiontakeswhenallmigrationis legal,
i.e. whenV = 0. In thiscasewehave
bD = 1? JÝ1? KÞ ? 4K_
sothatheoptimaltaxratebD isclearlydecreasingin_. Inotherwords, thelowerthedegreeof
attachmenttotheircountryoforiginonthepartof immigrants, asmeasuredby1? _, thehigher
theoptimalrateof labourincometaxation.
Returningtothecaseofbothlegalandillegalmigration, unfortunatelynoclosedformcanbe
meaningfullyanalysedfortherootsofequation( ref: tausquare ). Wehavethereforeproceeded
totheirnumericalinterpolationfordifferentvaluesoftheparametersJ, K, V, and_.
Bysodoingwecan, inparticular, obtaintworesultsthatareof interestfromthepointof
viewofthispaper. In factwecanseethatbD, theoptimaltaxrateonlabourincomeis(i)
increasinginV, and(ii) decreasingin_.
As for(i), thehigherthemaximumrateof immigrantshatenterthecountryillegaly, as
measuredbyV, thehigheristheoptimalrateoftaxationof labourincome. Thisfirstresultis
intuitive: illegalimmigrantsdonotcontributetofinancingthepensionscheme, butneitherthey
drawonitsresources. However, byincreasingthehostcountry’s labourforce, theytendto
reducetherealwage, andthereforethetaxationbaseforthepensionscheme. It followsthata
higherateof labourincometaxationisrequiredtofinancethescheme.
As for(ii), thehighertheshareof legalimmigrantshatprefertoremaininthehostcountry
afteretirement, asmeasuredby_, thelowertheoptimalrateof labourincometaxation. This
maybepuzzling, andiscertainlynotasintuitiveasthefirstresult. However, it followsfrom
legalimmigrantsbeing”exploited” if theydecidetorepatriate, sinceinthiscasetheyarenot














It hasbeenshownthat, besideinfluencingtheshareof legalimmigrantshatdecidetoremain
inthecountryafteretirement, thegovernment, bycontrollingtherateof labourincometaxation,
canalsooptimisewithrespecttotheshareof immigrantshatcomeillegallyintothecountry.
Inconclusion, twointerestingresultstandout: (i) thehigherthemaximumrateof
immigrantshatenterthecountryillegaly, thehigheristheoptimalrateoftaxationof labour




?ß1? KÝ1? 4_ÞJV ? JVà
2JV
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ßÝ1? JVÞ ? KÝ1? 4_ÞJVà2 + 4JVßÝ1? JÞÝ1? KÞ + KÝ1? 4_ÞÝ1? JVÞà
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